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Comment on Noah Carl for Political Quarterly 
Listening to the experts on European monetary integration 
Waltraud Schelkle 
 Noah Carl’s article is a fairly representative contribution to the distinctive genre of 
‘European dystopias’.  His Eurozone is a dystopia in the precise sense of the Oxford 
Dictionary: ‘An imagined place or state in which everything is unpleasant or bad, 
typically a totalitarian or environmentally degraded one.’ The fevered imaginations are 
usually those of US economists; the source of their bleak predictions is the economic 
theory of optimal currency areas. Carl extends the economic analysis to the realm of 
identity politics, and enlists a few more authors that inspired his own dystopia, among 
them that well-known scholar of all things monetary and European, Mrs I-want-my-
money-back Thatcher.  
My comment takes up three claims that characterise the genre. The first is Carl’s central 
argument that the monetary union got into such a bad state because Eurozone 
policymakers did not listen to economic experts when embarking on the euro experiment. 
The second is that the Eurozone has only a political and no economic rationale. The third 
is that the US-Dollarzone is the blessed land which functions so well because it conforms 
to the theory of optimal currency areas.  
The economic experts told you so 
Carl’s argument on expertise goes like this: we can find a number of people who express 
scepticism about the euro and, because most of them are economists, their scepticism 
represents an expert consensus which must be true. But, with the exception of Paul 
Krugman, none of the economists Carl cites has ever contributed to research on currency 
unions or optimal currency areas. They just refer to received wisdom – not the latest 
research -- on the subject. Even if their claims to expertise were better founded, scholarly 
debates are not decided by referendums of experts. For good reason: there are different 
interpretations of the same theory, qualifications to every finding, legitimate questions 
about applicability in each specific case. Carl does not give the reader any of this. His 
majoritarian approach to truth and knowledge is closer to Michael Gove’s than he 
realises; the difference is that Gove would enlist a larger constituency in his search for the 
majority opinion.  
A quote by Paul Collier sets the scene of ‘we told you so’. He is the key witness for Carl 
that all euro-sceptic experts are inspired by the same theory. But economists do not speak 
with one voice when they express scepticism about the euro experiment. Joe Stiglitz 
thought the euro was a good idea, but he criticised the member states for not going far 
enough and forming a full-fledged fiscal union that would protect member states against 
the vagaries of imperfect financial markets. For Stiglitz, more political will is all that’s 
needed and electorates would follow, contrary to Carl’s own bottom-up view of politics.1 
                                                 
1 My review of Stiglitz (2016), The Euro and its threat to the future of Europe, published by Penguin, can be 
found at URL: https://www.eustudies.org/eusa-review-of-books/11.  
Martin Feldstein saw the euro project as a French-led plot against US leadership; in other 
words, as a triumph of political will over economic calculation, the exact opposite of 
Stiglitz. Milton Friedman was most explicit in invoking the theory of optimal currency 
areas, but he used the theory loosely to support his case against any management of 
exchange rates. His view was that exchange rates, just like any other price, should be as 
flexible as possible. The three authors are at different ends of the spectrum as regards the 
underlying economics and politics. 
 
The theory of optimal currency areas enjoys much less secure support among economists 
than Carl realises. For a start, there are at least two versions of the theory. The original 
static version says that countries should not join a currency union unless they have 
sufficient wage flexibility or labour mobility to adjust to economic shocks without 
incurring a high cost in unemployment. Only then should they give up the possibility of 
using the exchange rate to adjust real wages fast. A dynamic version, much more in 
keeping with modern economics, proposes that wage and price setters will adjust to the 
exchange rate regime. In other words, forming a currency union could produce 
adjustments that lead towards optimality. This was an attractive possibility for policy-
makers in European countries that had experienced cycles of inflation and currency 
depreciation. 
The founding father of optimal currency area theory, Robert Mundell, subsequently 
distanced himself from it. The theory was developed in the early 1960s, when 
governments might reasonably think of the exchange rate as a policy instrument that they 
could adjust to steer the economy in the desired direction – capital mobility was low and 
financial markets repressed. Subsequently, as the Bretton Woods system collapsed and 
capital mobility increased, the exchange rate became not a servant but a tyrant, subject to 
overshooting and speculation, requiring interest rate policy to be dedicated to its 
stabilisation. Experts change their minds when circumstances and evidence change, and, 
by 1973, Mundell thought the priority must be to get rid of the instability of exchange 
rates that constantly upset growth and employment in major economies.2  
European policy-makers shared this view: as I explain below, they sought to maintain 
stable parities for many years before the introduction of the euro. Curiously, Paul 
Krugman, nowadays one of the leading US critics of the euro, made a major contribution 
to the theory of speculative currency attacks that could support the euro experiment.3 He 
developed simple models to explain why foreign exchange markets were so whimsical, 
despite traders acting rationally. Others went even further and argued that there could be 
rational self-fulfilling attacks, when currencies were forced to devalue not for any 
                                                 
2 Mundell, R. (1973). A plan for a European currency. In H. G. Johnson & A. Swoboda, K. (Eds.), The economics 
of common currencies. London: Allen & Unwin. 
3 Krugman, P. (1979). A model of balance-of-payments crises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 11(3), 
311-325. 
fundamental economic reason but because speculators had taken against them. The last 
big currency crisis in Europe, in 1992-3, seemed to follow exactly this pattern.4   
Another expert that Carl invokes was Peter Kenen, who pointed out the importance of 
fiscal transfers in managing economic shocks. In a balanced appraisal towards the end of 
his life, Kenen conceded, however, that optimal currency area theory simply did not 
speak to the Eurozone project.5 It was only about currency unions, where countries fix the 
exchange rate but retain their own monetary (interest rate) policies, exactly to make these 
fixed parities hold. This was not relevant for a monetary union that would create a 
common currency issued by one central bank, operating a common monetary policy. 
In sum, it is a myth to think that there was some simple message of optimal currency area 
theory that the Eurozone architects and decision-makers could have taken on board: there 
was neither a single view nor a lasting message to take to Brussels and Frankfurt. 
Why they did not listen 
The architects of the Eurozone were not ignorant of the theory of optimal currency areas. 
The One market, one money report, which is the founding document on the Economic 
and Monetary Union, is quite explicit about the limitations of the theory.6 The report was 
written by competent economists, with advisors from outside the Commission, among 
them Peter Kenen.  
Getting rid of the sources of exchange rate instability was the key common objective for 
all member states in the early 1990s. For two decades, they had tried all kinds of 
arrangements to stabilise exchange rates, with and without the cooperation from the 
United States. Whenever the D-Mark revalued against the US dollar, Germany’s 
European neighbours were between a rock and a hard place. If they kept their currencies 
pegged to the D-Mark, they lost market share in the US and other markets tied to the 
cheaper dollar. If they dissociated themselves from the strong German currency, they saw 
a rise in inflation and capital flight which forced their central banks, sooner or later, to 
tighten monetary conditions. For all prospective member states but Germany, exchange 
rates were not effective instruments of adjustment that could be reliably influenced but 
volatile prices that they had to stabilise with other instruments. 
Even for Germany, exchange rate fluctuations were a nuisance. Changes can be abrupt 
and are motivated by financial conditions, not by bringing trade into balance. Rather than 
responding to whether a country produces as much as it consumes, currency traders ask 
whether it is worthwhile to invest in assets denominated in one currency or another. A 
reliably strong currency may make such investment more worthwhile, strengthening it 
                                                 
4 This was the influential interpretation of Eichengreen, B., & Wyplosz, C. (1993). The Unstable EMS. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1993(1), 51-143. 
5 Kenen, P. B. (2000). Currency areas, policy domains, and the institutionalization of fixed exchange rates. CEP 
Discussion Paper, 467, London: LSE, Centre for Economic Performance, pp.16-17. 
6 CEC (1990). One Market, One Money. An evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of forming an 
economic and monetary union. European Economy, 44 (October), Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities, pp. 34-6; 45-6. 
further. And vice versa. In economies with less trusted currencies, firms and governments 
have to pay permanently higher interest rates and these risk premia stifle investment and 
the provision of public goods. Moreover, the Bundesbank policy that was right for 
Germany did not suit its neighbours and their different cyclical conditions.  The tensions 
thus created also frustrated the steady growth of German export markets. Finally, the 
power that foreign exchange traders bestowed on the Bundesbank was a political reason 
to press for currency unification, above all in France. So every prospective member state 
had its own reasons for seeing merit in a common currency; these reasons were neither 
irrational nor economically illiterate. 
Nor was the theory of optimal currency areas the only relevant economic theory. Indeed, 
the euro experiment could draw on the most advanced economics at the time. Paul 
Krugman received his Nobel Prize in economics for work that – unintentionally -- 
provided several rationales for the Eurozone. As already mentioned, the theory of 
speculative currency attacks underpinned the creation of the euro. He had also revived 
economic geography and trade theory by adding theoretical insights about market 
imperfections to these somewhat stale areas of economic research.7 For instance, a 
common currency – by removing a trade barrier and by creating a zone of stability -- 
increased the economies of scale for national champions as well as producers of 
specialised brands, allowing them to lower their prices and raise the growth potential of 
entire economies.  
Against this background, it is not at all puzzling why EU member states did not listen to 
the theory of optimal currency areas. They did not try to create one. Rather, they were 
tired of their dependence on the US for monetary stability and were not keen to simply 
substitute the D-Mark for the US-dollar; not even German policymakers sought this 
responsibility. It is rather more puzzling why a brilliant economist like Paul Krugman has 
forgotten that his path-breaking work could be read as justifying the euro experiment and 
now prefers to sound like one of the grumpy old men he once challenged so successfully. 
The sub-optimal Dollarzone 
The dystopians rarely feel the need to provide evidence that the euro area is exceptionally 
unpleasant or bad. If they do, the promised land for the Europeans is the US. The US is, 
allegedly, an optimal currency area, with its flexible labour market, high labour mobility 
and a federal budget. The contribution of labour mobility to the stabilisation of shocks on 
a state’s output and income has always been trivial, as research since the early 1990s 
showed.8 Moreover, recent evidence casts doubt on the oft-repeated claim that mobility is 
higher in the US than in the euro area.9 Labour mobility in the US has been in secular 
                                                 
7 For instance, Krugman, P, (1991). Geography and Trade, Boston, MA: The MIT Press. 
8 Barro, R., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1991). Convergence across States and Regions. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 107-158. 
9 Dao, M., Furceri, D., & Loungani, P. (2014). Regional Labor Market Adjustments in the United States and 
Europe. IMF Working Paper, No. 14/26, Washington, DC: IMF; Jauer, J., Liebig, T., Martin, J. P., & Puhani, P. 
(2014). Migration as an Adjustment Mechanism in the Crisis? A Comparison of Europe and the United States 
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 155. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
decline since around the 1980s, with a new low reached in the recent crisis.10 However, 
and this is the last blow to the obsession with labour mobility, it is questionable whether 
this matters: not only does labour migration contribute little to stabilisation, it can have 
perverse long-run effects. When young pro-active members of the workforce leave a 
country, high mobility can turn temporary economic troubles into permanent decline. 
The thrust of Carl’s article is, however, that the Eurozone needs a US-style fiscal 
federation or it is doomed. This is why national identity is so important: the attachment of 
Europeans to their national histories, languages and traditions makes a fiscal union 
impossible. In this light, it is interesting to note that the US dollar (the ‘greenback’) was 
introduced during the Civil War when the country had politically broken up. It was an 
imposition of the victorious North on the defeated South, consuming political life in the 
following three decades with bitter disputes about the monetary regime. Indeed, the 
sequencing of the single currency experiment in the US had pitfalls even greater than 
those of the euro area. Two attempts at introducing a central bank were short-lived, and 
the country experienced an endless series of financial crises. Not until after the trauma of 
the Great Depression were the institutions of monetary stability put in place, with the 
emergence of an effective policymaking central bank and the creation of a bank deposit 
guarantee scheme with resolution authority. 
Furthermore, fiscal union in the US is not all it might appear. There are indeed federal 
transfers to the states but these induce responses in the states’ own budgetary practices 
which limit their stabilising effects. Balanced budget rules make US states tighten their 
belts in recessions and spendthrift in booms, obstructing the counter-cyclical stabilisers of 
the federal budget. Welfare states are great automatic stabilisers, through progressive 
income taxes and unemployment benefits. But the US system creates incentives for 
welfare minimalism because the states do not want to attract vulnerable migrants and 
retain high earners with low taxes. The Eurozone architects did not deny that monetary 
unions need fiscal activism, but they thought that, in a union of welfare states, each 
government should take measures at the national level to promote stability. 
Evidently they underestimated the need to share fiscal safety nets, particularly in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis when some governments lost access to sovereign debt 
markets. But how much fiscal union is needed to counter that problem? It is by no means 
self-evident that a large expansion of a conventional central government budget is 
needed. The creation of the European Stability Mechanism, which issues bonds that fund 
loans to member states without market access, has helped to calm the crisis. It constitutes 
a very large mutual insurance fund: at its height, guaranteeing sums about three times as 
great as the maximum that the IMF ever lent. The EU11 managed this politically because, 
contrary to Carl’s presentation, the European Stability Mechanism is not ‘indirectly 
funded by taxpayers in rich Northern European countries’. Loans are guaranteed by every 
                                                 
10 Molloy, R., Smith, C. L., & Wozniak, A. (2014). Declining migration within the U.S.: the role of the labor 
market NBER Working Paper 20065. Cambridge, MA: NBER. 
11 Non- euro members can draw on this emergency fund, too, if they have signed the Fiscal Compact. The 
UK under David Cameron’s government refused to sign this multilateral treaty outside the EU framework.  
member state (except those who have a bailout programme) according to its share in the 
paid-up capital of the ECB, emulating exactly the funding of IMF programmes. More 
resource pooling is probably needed for cases of a systemic crisis (ie vast common 
shocks), such as a joint fiscal back-up of the newly created resolution mechanism to be 
paid for by the financial industry. But such fiscal re-insurance may be sufficient to make 
the monetary union viable. The maximalist demand for a full-fledged fiscal union is 
dancing to the euro-phobes’ tune.  
Experts who want to be respected must earn it. Their job is to update received wisdom, 
call their own preconceptions into question when new phenomena arise, and explain to 
policymakers why there are no simple answers. The creation of the euro, a supranational 
currency that democratic nation states can choose to adopt, is one of the greatest 
experiments in history. Rising to that challenge requires more than recycling outdated 
economic theories and advancing loose claims about the need for a common European 
identity. 
 
Waltraud Schelkle is a political economist at the European Institute of LSE. She has 
recently published The political economy of monetary solidarity: understanding the euro 
experiment with Oxford University Press. 
 
